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ABSTRACT. We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are
faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. New buyers arrive on the market probabilisti-
cally, and are each endowed with a constant private value. Moreover, objects also arrive on
the market at random times, so the number of competitors and the degree of informational
asymmetry among them may vary across from one auction to the next. We demonstrate
by way of a simple example the inefficiency of the second-price sealed-bid auction in this
setting, and therefore assume that each object is sold via ascending auction.
We then characterize an efficient and fully revealing equilibrium for the game in which
the objects are sold via ascending auctions. We show that each buyer’s bids and payoffs
depend only upon their rank amongst their competitors and the (revealed) values of those
with lower values. Furthermore, strategies are memoryless—bids depend only upon the
information revealed in the current auction, and not on any information that may have
been revealed in earlier periods. We then demonstrate that the sequential ascending auc-
tion serves as an indirect mechanism that is equivalent—in our setting—to the dynamic
marginal contribution mechanism introduced by Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) and gen-
eralized in Cavallo et al. (2007).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many markets, most notably internet markets such as eBay, sell multiple objects via se-
quential auctions in which one object is sold at a time. In this paper, we examine a model
of such markets in which new buyers arrive on the market at random times. Each bidder
has an independently drawn private value for purchasing an object. In contrast to much
of the literature that makes use of sealed-bid auctions, we focus on the ascending auc-
tion. Although these two auctions are in many respects equivalent in a static setting with
private values, this equivalence does not hold in a dynamic environment, primarily due
to the information revelation inherent in the ascending auction format. The difference
between the two formats is further exacerbated in the sequential auction setting when we
allow for the entry of new buyers. In particular, the entry of a new buyer introduces an
additional informational asymmetry. We show, however, that this asymmetry is easily re-
solved when the ascending auction is used. In equilibrium, each buyer’s bids and payoffs
depend only on the buyer’s rank amongst their competitors and the (revealed) values of
those opponents with lower values. Furthermore, these strategies have the remarkable
property of being memoryless—in each auction conducted, bids are independent of any
information that may have been revealed in previous periods, despite the fact that all
private information is revealed in each and every auction.
We feel that this model serves as a useful abstraction of online auction sites such as
eBay or uBid, especially when considering the extensive market on these sites for indi-
vidual units of brand-new homogenous goods. Typically, a variety of auctions for iden-
tical items are open simultaneously, but may be ordered by their closing time. Thus,
abstracting away from intra-auction dynamics, a sequential auction model yields a good
approximation.1 With this in mind, many authors (see Sailer (2006) or Zeithammer (2006),
for instance) make use of the second-price sealed-bid auction, citing evidence from Roth
and Ockenfels (2002) and Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) about the prevalence of “sniping”
(last-second bidding) in online auctions in defense of their modeling choice. However, as
shown by Cai et al. (2007), pure-strategy symmetric equilibria do not exist in sequential
sealed-bid auctions when buyer values are fixed across time and bids are made publicly
observable after each auction. As most online auctions bear a close resemblance to Eng-
lish auctions in regards to intra-auction dynamics as well as the visibility of submitted
bids (both during an auction and after an auction has closed), we believe that the ascend-
ing auction is better-suited than the sealed-bid second-price auction for modeling online
auction markets.2
1Nekipelov (2007) examines within-auction dynamics with an eye towards entry behavior in a model of
eBay auctions.
2Of course, either choice is a compromise, abstracting away from important real-world issues for the sake
of tractability.
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What is more, we feel that the sequential ascending auction is important for another,
independent, reason. Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) demonstrate the suitability of se-
quential ascending auctions as a simple way to provide for the truthful implementation
of the socially efficient allocation in some dynamic environments. In particular, they pro-
vide an example in which sequential ascending auctions are equivalent to their dynamic
marginal contribution mechanism. This equivalence fails to hold, however, in a more
complex setting with multiple-unit demand. Cavallo et al. (2007) generalize this dynamic
version of the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to settings in which agents may
be “inaccessible” for periods of time. The present work complements these papers, as
we show that the sequential ascending auction serves as an (easily implemented and un-
derstood) indirect mechanism that is equivalent to the dynamic marginal contribution
mechanism, and is therefore an incentive compatible mechanism for inducing socially
efficient choices.
The present work is closely related to several papers in the sequential auctions litera-
ture. Milgrom and Weber (2000) examine the properties of a variety of auction formats
for the (simultaneous or sequential) sale of multiple objects with a fixed set of buyers
and objects.3 In regards to the ascending auction with private values, they show that, in
equilibrium, buyers bid exactly their values. However, they allow for neither discounting
nor the entry of new buyers, features that play a large role our model. The vast major-
ity of the literature following that work has chosen to focus on sealed-bid auctions; for
example, the previously mentioned Sailer (2006) and Zeithammer (2006) conduct empir-
ical studies of eBay auctions making use of sequential second-price sealed-bid auctions
and assumptions of an effectively static environment. Kittsteiner et al. (2004) examine the
role of discounting in sequential sealed-bid auctions, and prove a revenue equivalence
result for auctions in which the only information revealed is the valuations of bidders
who have already left the market, while Jeitschko (1998) considers a model of first-price
sealed-bid auctions in which winner’s bids are revealed, allowing the remaining buyers
to update their beliefs about their opponents’ valuations. On the other hand, Cai et al.
(2007) demonstrate the nonexistence of pure-strategy symmetric equilibria in sealed-bid
sequential auction models in which all bids are revealed. The only paper that we are
aware of that examines sequential ascending auctions is that of Caillaud and Mezzetti
(2004), who examine reserve prices in a model with only two auctions.
Certain elements within the bargaining with incomplete information literature are also
related to our model. Inderst (2008) considers a bargaining model in which a seller is
randomly visited by heterogeneous buyers. If the seller is currently engaged in bargain-
ing with one agent when another arrives, she may choose to switch from one buyer to
3Note that this work was originally completed in 1982 and was in wide circulation in working paper form
until its eventual publication in 2000.
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the other. However, this switch is permanent, implying that the arrival of a new buyer
either “restarts” the game or is completely irrelevant. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2007) take
a different approach: they consider an incomplete information bargaining problem be-
tween a buyer and a seller, and allow for the possibility of the arrival of “events” which
end the game and yield a particular expected payoff to each agent. Their interpretation
is that these events may be viewed as triggers for some sort of multi-lateral mechanism
involving new entrants (a second-price auction, for example) for which the expected pay-
offs are a reduced-form representation. Thus, while both works are primarily concerned
with characterizing the endogenous option value that results from the potential arrival
of additional participants to the market, they do this in a framework of bilateral bargain-
ing which fails to capture the dynamic nature of competition among several current and
potential market participants. On the other hand, Nekipelov (2007) studies the role of
entry during an online ascending auction, while Said (2008) examines the role of buyer
entry between periods in a model of sequential second-price auctions in which objects are
stochastically equivalent. By way of comparison, the present work incorporates buyer
entry between ascending auctions in a more standard private values framework, and fur-
ther demonstrates the relationship between the endogenous option value arising from
participating in future auctions with the marginal contribution to social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2, and then provide
a simple example demonstrating the superiority of the ascending auction format over
the second-price sealed-bid auction in a dynamic setting with buyer entry in section 3.
Section 4 solves for the equilibrium in our model with buyer entry and demonstrates
some of its desirable properties. In section 5, we discuss the relationship between our
model and the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and generalize our setting to
allow for the random arrival of objects. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a market in which time is discrete; periods are indexed by t ∈ N. There
is a finite number nt of risk-neutral buyers with single-unit demand in the market in any
given period t. Each buyer i ∈ {1, . . . , nt} has a valuation vi ∈ R+, where vi is drawn from
the distribution F with corresponding density f . We assume that valuations are private
information, and are independently and identically distributed across buyers. Moreover,
additional buyers may arrive on the market in each period. We will assume that at most
one buyer arrives at a time, and that this arrival occurs with some exogenously given
probability q ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we assume that buyers discount the future exponentially
with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
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In each period, there is exactly one object available for sale via an ascending auction.
The auction begins with the price at zero and all bidders participating in the auction. Each
bidder may choose to any price at which to drop out of the auction. This exit decision is
irreversible (in the current period), and is observable by all agents currently present in
the market. Finally, the auction ends whenever exactly 1 active bidder remains, and the
price paid by this winning bidder is the price at which the last exit occurred. Note that we
assume that the number of active bidders is commonly known throughout the auction.
With this in mind, each bidder’s strategy within a given period is not a single bid, but
rather a sequence of functions, each of which is contingent on the (observed) exit prices
of the bidders who have already dropped out of the current auction.
Throughout, we will denote by vˆ the ordered vector of realized buyer valuations, where
vˆ1 > vˆ2 > · · · > vˆnt .
Furthermore, we will denote by Vj,k(vˆ) the expected payoff of the buyer with the j-th
highest of k values. For example, if there are three bidders present, with v2 > v3 > v1,
then vˆ = {v2, v3, v1}, bidder 1’s payoff is V3,3(vˆ), bidder 2’s payoff is V1,3(vˆ), and bidder 3’s
payoff is V2,3(vˆ).
3. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Suppose that there are two buyers on the market with values v1, v2 ∈ [0, 1], where,
without loss of generality, we assume that v1 > v2. In addition, a third potential buyer
with value v3 ∼ F , where F is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] may enter the market
with probability q ∈ (0, 1). Each of these buyers wishes to purchase exactly one unit of
some object which is being sold via a sequence of three auctions. All buyers discount time
with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, we make the assumption that v1 and v2 are
commonly known amongst all buyers, which may be viewed as the result of information
being revealed via bidding behavior in some (unmodeled) previous periods. The new
entrant’s value, however, is her own private information. We will consider two versions
of this example; first, we assume that objects are sold via second-price auctions in which
the buyers’ bids are revealed after each round, and then we will assume that objects are
sold via ascending auctions.
We begin with the second-price auction. Note that in any round in which there is only
one bidder present, that bidder receives the object at a price of zero, regardless of her
bid. Therefore, if there are two bidders present in the second period, each bidder i has an
option value of δvi from losing. Thus, regardless of the information that each bidder has
about the other, it is weakly dominant for each bidder to submit a bid of their true value
less their option value—the optimal bid for each bidder i is (1− δ)vi. Thus, denoting the
payoff of a bidder in the second round when there are two bidders present as U(vi, vj),
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we have
(3.1) U(vi, vj) =
{
vi − (1− δ)vj if vi > vj,
δvi if vi ≤ vj.
Using this expression, we may write the payoff of a lone bidder with value vi as U(vi, 0).
Now consider the third bidder (when present). Under the assumption that bidder 1
bids a greater amount than bidder 2 (that is, that b1 > b2), the third bidder faces a choice
between winning the auction and receiving a payoff of v3 − b1 or losing the auction and
facing bidder 2 in the next period, yielding a payoff of δU(v3, v2). Thus, bidder 3 prefers
to win if, and only if, v3 − b1 ≥ δU(v3, v2), or, equivalently, b1 ≤ v3 − δU(v3, v2). She can
then win the auction if, and only if, it is optimal for her to do so by bidding
(3.2) b3(v3) = v3 − δU(v3, v2) =
{
(1− δ)v3 + δ(1− δ)v2 if v3 > v2,
(1− δ2)v3 if v3 ≤ v2.
Note that b3 is strictly increasing in v3, and hence fully identifies bidder 3’s valuation in
the next period when bids are revealed. For convenience, we will denote by u1 and u2 the
values of bidder 3 that submit bids equal to those of bidders 1 and 2, respectively; that is,
u1 = b
−1
3 (b1) and u2 = b
−1
3 (b2).
Now consider the case of bidder 2’s bid in the first period of the game. If she submits
a winning bid in the first period, she receives a payoff of v2 − b∗, where b∗ is the highest
competing bid that she faces. On the other hand, if she loses the first-round auction, she
receives a payoff of δE[U(v2, v∗)], where
v∗ =

0 with probability 1− q,
v3 with probability qF (u1),
v1 with probability q (1− F (u1)) .
Thus, bidder 2 prefers to win if, and only if, v2− b∗ ≥ δE[U(v2, v∗)]. She may then guaran-
tee that she wins only when it is desirable to do so by bidding
b2 = v2 − δE[U(v2, v∗)]
= v2 − δ
[
(1− q)v2 + δq (1− F (u1)) v2
+q
∫ v2
0
(v2 − (1− δ)v′) dF (v′) + q
∫ u1
v2
δv3 dF (v
′)
]
= (1− δ)(1 + δq)v2 − (1− δ)δq v
2
2
2
.(3.3)
Finally, let us consider buyer 1’s bidding behavior in the first period of the game. Note
first that u2 < v2 < v1, implying that if bidder 1 loses today, she will definitely win the
auction in the next period. To see this, note that if bidder 3 enters and wins the first round,
bidder 1 faces v2 < v1 in the next period. On the other hand, if bidder 2 is the high bidder
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in the first round, then bidder 1 is either alone or faces v3 < u2 < v1 in the second round.
Thus, when the high opponent bid is b∗, winning yields bidder 1 a payoff of v1− b∗, while
losing yields a payoff of δU(v1, v∗), where
v∗ =

0 with probability 1− q,
v3 with probability qF (u2),
v2 with probability q (1− F (u2)) .
Thus, similar to the cases of bidders 2 and 3, bidder 1 may guarantee that she wins only
when it is desirable for her to do so by bidding
b1 = v1 − δE[U(v1, v∗)] = v1 − δ
[
(1− q)v1 + δq (1− F (u2)) (v1 − (1− δ)v2)
+q
∫ u2
0
(v1 − (1− δ)v′) dF (v′)
]
.
Recall that u2 = b−13 (b2) < v2, implying that u2 = b2/(1 − δ2). Combining this with the
assumption that F (x) = x implies that
u2 =
b2
1− δ2 =
1 + δq
1 + δ
v2 − δq
1 + δ
v22
2
.
Thus, we may conclude that
b1 = (1− δ)v1 + (1− δ)δqv2
− δ(1− δ)(1 + δq)(1 + δ(2− q))qv
2
2
2(1 + δ)2
+
δ3(1− δ)(1− q)q2v32
2(1 + δ)2
+
δ3(1− δ)q3v42
8(1 + δ)2
.
(3.4)
For clarity, Figure 1 plots the bids of all three buyers for fixed parameter values.4 The
key features to note are that u1 < v1 and u2 < v2; use of the second-price auction in this
context may lead to inefficient outcomes, as “low” values of bidder 3 may outbid bidders
1 and 2 despite their having higher values. This result is driven by two main features
of our setting: first, agents discount the future and hence the order in which objects are
allocated matters; and second, there is a fundamental asymmetry in information—not
only is bidder 3’s value private information, but the very presence of bidder 3 on the
market is information that is asymmetrically distributed amongst the buyers. Thus, in
addition to the nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in sequential second-price sealed-
bid auctions as demonstrated by Cai et al. (2007), allowing for random entry may induce
inefficient outcomes—even in the asymmetric equilibria.
We now demonstrate that the ascending auction does not share the inefficiency of the
second-price auction in this setting. Note that when there are only two bidders present,
the losing bidder is guaranteed a payoff of δvi in the next period. Therefore, bidders are
willing to remain active in an auction until the price reaches (1− δ)vi. Thus, the expected
4The qualitative features of the equilibrium do not depend on these parameter values.
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Figure 1: Bids when v1 = 23 , v2 =
1
3
, v3 ∼ U [0, 1], δ = 910 , and q = 14 .
payoff of a bidder when she has only one opponent present on the market is given by
U(vi, vj) from Equation 3.1.
When there are three bidders present, matters are slightly different. In particular, the
very nature of an ascending auction immediately reveals to all bidders the number of
participants. Thus, bidder 3 is unable to keep private her presence on the market. This
implies that the first bidder to drop out of the auction knows that they have the lowest
value among three bidders, and hence will receive an expected payoff of δ2vi. Thus, each
of the three bidders remains active until the price reaches
(1− δ2)vi.
Denoting by vˆ3 the lowest of the three values, the two remaining bidders now know that
they are guaranteed a payoff of U(vi, vˆ3) in the following period, and are hence willing to
remain active until they are indifferent between winning at the current price and winning
the object in the following period; that is, until the price reaches
(1− δ)vi + δ(1− δ)vˆ3.
Notice that these cutoff prices are strictly increasing in each bidder’s value, and hence are
both efficient and fully revealing.5 Thus, we have established that the ascending auction
does not suffer from the same shortcomings as the second-price auction in this relatively
simple setting. Thus, we will focus exclusively on the ascending auction from this point
forward.
5In addition, it is straightforward to verify that these strategies do, in fact, constitute an equilibrium. Con-
ditional on participation, no bidder wishes to deviate from these strategies. Furthermore, no bidder wishes
to postpone their participation to a future period.
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4. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
4.1. Preliminaries and Equilibrium Strategies. One of the most remarkable features of
the equilibrium that we construct in this model is that buyer’s bids and payoffs do not
depend upon the valuations of higher-ranked bidders (neither in expectation nor realiza-
tion), even if that information is publicly available. Recall that vˆ is the ordered vector of
realized buyer valuations, where
vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn,
and that we denote by Vk,n(vˆ) the expected payoff of the buyer with the k-th highest of
n values. To show the property described above, we will show that (abusing notation
slightly) we may write
Vk,n(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = Vk,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆn).
A formal statement of this result may be found in the subsequent section; in the meantime,
we will describe the equilibrium taking this property as a given.
So, suppose that an auction is in progress with n bidders, where vˆ ∈ Rn+ denotes the
(ordered) vector of realized buyer valuations. When all bidders are still active, a bidder
with valuation vi who drops out of the bidding learns (and reveals) that, in equilibrium,
she has the lowest value; that is, that vˆn = vi. Therefore, her expected payoff in the next
period is Vn−1,n−1(vi), as at the beginning of the next period, there will be n − 1 bidders
remaining (the current periods n bidders less the winning buyer) and she will have the
lowest value. Therefore, each bidder i should remain in the auction until the current price
p is such that
vi − p = δVn−1,n−1(vi).
At this price, bidder i is indifferent between purchasing the object today and waiting until
the next period when i will be the lowest-valued buyer. Thus, when no one has dropped
out, bidder i will remain in the auction until the price reaches
(4.1) βn,n(vi) := vi − δVn−1,n−1(vi).
Once someone drops out of the auction, the remaining n−1 bidders learn the realization
of vˆn and that they are not the lowest-valued competitor.6 Therefore, the next bidder (with
value vi) to drop out reveals herself to be the second-lowest of the n bidders; therefore,
her expected payoff in the next period is Vn−2,n−1(vi, vˆn), as she will be the second-lowest
of the n − 1 buyers remaining in the following period. Thus, each bidder i who has not
already dropped out should remain in the auction until the current price p is such that
she is indifferent between purchasing the object in the present period and waiting until
6This of course requires βn,n to be a strictly increasing function, something that we will verify in short order.
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the next period
vi − p = δVn−2,n−1(vi, vˆn).
Thus, when no one has dropped out, bidder i remains in the auction until the price reaches
(4.2) βn−1,n(vi, vˆn) := vi − δVn−2,n−1(vi, vˆn).
Proceeding inductively, we define for each k = 2, . . . , n the bidding function
(4.3) βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) := vi − δVk−1,n−1(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn).
These bidding functions define the drop-out points for a bidder with value vi when there
are k buyers still active in the auction. Notice that this implies that the final price in this
auction will be
β2,n(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) = vˆ2 − δV1,n−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn).
Keep in mind, however, that we must verify that these bid functions are strictly mono-
tone (so that values are revealed), and also that these bidding strategies in fact form an
equilibrium. This requires a characterization of the expected payoff functions Vj,k.
4.2. The Payoff Functions. As a preview of our results, consider first the case of a lone
buyer present on the market at the beginning of a period with valuation v1, and that
a second buyer may arrive with probability q. Once the price clock starts rising, it is
immediately revealed whether there are one or two bidders present. Thus, there is no
asymmetric information regarding the number of active bidders.
Note that if the second bidder does not arrive, the lone bidder receives the object for
free. In the case of two bidders present, however, each bidder i = 1, 2 will stay in the
auction until the price rises to β2,2(vi) = vi − δV1,1(vi). Thus,
V1,1(v1) = (1− q)v1 + q
[∫ v1
0
(v1 − β2,2(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vi
δV1,1(v1) dF (v
′)
]
.
The first term in this expression is bidder 1’s payoff if she is alone on the market. The sec-
ond term is her expected payoff if a second bidder arrives, and is the sum of her expected
winnings if the second bidder has a lower value than her and her expected continuation
payoff if she loses the auction. Differentiation of this expression with respect to v1 and
then substituting for β2,2(v1) yields
V ′1,1(v1) = (1− q) + q (f(v1)v1 + F (v1)− f(v1)β2,2(v1))
− δq ((1− F (v1))V ′1,1(v1)− f(v1)V1,1(v1))
=
1− q(1− F (v1))
1− δq(1− F (v1)) .
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Note that we may rewrite this expression as
∞∑
t=0
(δq(1− F (v1)))t [1− q(1− F (v1))],
which is the summation of the expected per-period gain from a marginal increase in v1,
discounted by the probability of that gain being realized in any given period.
Furthermore, note that V1,1(0) = 0, implying that
(4.4) V1,1(vi) = V1,1(0) +
∫ vi
0
V1,1(v
′) dv′ =
∫ vi
0
1− q(1− F (v′))
1− δq(1− F (v′)) dv
′.
Note that the integrand above is strictly positive for all v′ ∈ R+. Hence, V1,1 is strictly
increasing, as is β2,2.
We will now proceed to characterize Vj,k inductively for all k ∈ N and all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
via a series of propositions.
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness of Vj,k).
Fix any k > 1, and suppose that the expected payoff to a buyer when a period starts with k − 1
bidders present depends only on the rank of that bidder and the values of those with values lower
than her; that is, given (known) values vˆ ∈ Rk−1+ , the j-th highest of the k − 1 bidders receives
expected payoff Vj,k−1(vˆj, . . . , vˆk−1). Then the expected payoff of the j-th highest of k bidders,
for all j = 1, . . . , k, is given by Vj,k(vˆj, . . . , vˆk). Furthermore, given {Vj,k−1}kj=1, the functions
{Vj,k}kj=1 are uniquely determined.
Proof. The proof may be found in the appendix.
Thus, the strategies in Equation 4.3 lead to well-defined and unique value functions
for the buyers. In addition, following these strategies implies that these expected payoffs
are not dependent upon history—they do not depend upon the values or prices paid
in previous periods—but rather depend only upon the values of those ranked below a
bidder.
We may also use the indifference inherent in the definition of our conjectured equi-
librium strategy in order to illustrate the link between the various payoff functions. In
particular, we have the following
Proposition 2 (Relationship between Vl,k and V1,k).
Fix any k ∈ N. Then for all l = 1, . . . , k, the expected payoff to the l-th ranked of k buyer is equal
to that of the highest-ranked buyer when she is tied with l − 1 of her opponents; that is,
Vl,k(vˆl, . . . , vˆk) = V1,k(vˆl, . . . , vˆl, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk).
Proof. The proof may be found in the appendix.
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As mentioned above, this result makes heavy use of the indifference conditions built
into the bidding strategies described in Equation 4.3, and in particular the indifference of
the buyer with the second-highest value. This bidder drops out at a price at which she is
indifferent between winning immediately or waiting one period. Unsurprisingly, when
the top two buyers have the same value, they must receive the same payoff, regardless
of the tie-breaking rule used to determine which one of the two should receive the ob-
ject when they drop out simultaneously. The intuition behind the relationship between
lower-ranked buyers’ payoff functions is analogous. Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that
knowledge of the functions {V1,k}∞k=1 is sufficient to determine the remaining value func-
tions. Thus, define the functions µ : R+ → [1− q, 1] and η : R+ → [1− δq, 1] by
µ(v) = 1− q(1− F (v)),
η(v) = 1− δq(1− F (v)).(4.5)
We have the following
Theorem 1 (Characterization of Vl,k).
For all k ∈ N and all l = 1, . . . , k,
(4.6) Vl,k(vˆ) = δl−1
∫ vˆl
0
µl(v′)
ηl(v′)
dv′ − (1− δ)
k∑
j=l+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′.
Proof. Note that we may write V1,k(vˆ) as
V1,k(vˆ) = (1− q) [vˆ1 − β2,k(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk)]
+ q
[
k−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
(
vˆ1 − β2,k+1(ˆˆv−1(v′))
)
dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δV1,k(vˆ) dF (v
′)
]
.
(4.7)
We will denote by V (j)1,k the partial derivative of V1,k with respect to its j-th argument.
Differentiation with respect to vˆ1 then implies that
V
(1)
1,k (vˆ) = 1− q(1− F (vˆ1)) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))V (1)1,k (vˆ) =
µ(vˆ1)
η(vˆ1)
.
Notice that this result is independent of k. Furthermore, note that this implies that V j1,k(vˆ)
does not depend on vˆ1 for any j 6= 1; equivalently,
V
(1,j)
1,k (vˆ) = 0 for all vˆ ∈ Rk+ and j 6= 1.
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Differentiating Equation 4.7 with respect to vˆ2 now leads to
V
(2)
1,k (vˆ) = − (1− q(1− F (vˆ2)) + δ(1− q)V (1)1,k−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))V (2)1,k (vˆ)
+ δq
k−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
V
(1)
1,k (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) + δq
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
V
(2)
1,k (v
′, vˆ2, . . . , vˆk) dF (v′).
Note first that ∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
V
(2)
1,k (v
′, vˆ2, . . . , vˆk) dF (v′) = (F (vˆ1)− F (vˆ2))V (2)1,k (vˆ)
since V (1,2)1,k = 0. Moreover,
k−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
V
(1)
1,k (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) =
∫ vˆ2
0
µ(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
dF (v′) = F (vˆ2)
µ(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
.
Thus, we have
V
(2)
1,k (vˆ) =
−µ(vˆ2) + δµ(vˆ2)µ(vˆ2)η(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
= −µ(vˆ2) (η(vˆ2)− δµ(vˆ2))
η2(vˆ2)
= −(1− δ) µ(vˆ2)
η2(vˆ2)
.
Note that, as with V (1)1,k , V
(2)
1,k depends only on the second argument of V1,k. Thus,
V
(2,j)
1,k (vˆ) = 0 for all vˆ ∈ Rk−1+ and j 6= 2.
Proceeding inductively, fix any l ∈ {3, . . . , k} for arbitrary k ∈ N, and suppose that
V
(j)
1,k (vˆ) = −(1− δ)δj−2
µj−1(vˆj)
ηj(vˆj)
for all j = 2, . . . , l − 1. Differentiating Equation 4.7 with respect to vˆl yields
V
(l)
1,k(vˆ) = δ(1− q)V (l−1)1,k−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk) + δq
k−l∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
V
(l−1)
1,k (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+ δq
k−1∑
j=k−l+1
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
V
(l)
1,k(
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))V (l)1,k(vˆ).
Since V (l−1)1,k does not depend on any of its arguments but the (l − 1)-th,
k−l∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
V
(l−1)
1,k (
ˆˆv−1(v′) dF (v′) = F (vˆl)V
(l−1)
1,k−1(vˆ−1).
In addition, V (l,j)1,k = 0 for all j < l implies that
k−1∑
j=k−l+1
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
V
(l)
1,k(
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) = (F (vˆ1)− F (vˆl))V (l)1,k(vˆ).
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Thus, we have
V
(l)
1,k(vˆ) = δ(1− q)V (l−1)1,k−1(vˆ−1) + δqF (vˆl)V (l−1)1,k−1(vˆ−1) + δq(1− F (vˆl))V (l)1,k(vˆ)
=
δµ(vˆk)
[
−(1− δ)δl−3 µl−2(vˆl)
ηl−1(vˆl)
]
η(vˆl)
= −(1− δ)δl−2µ
l−1(vˆl)
ηl(vˆl)
.
By induction, the above expression holds for all l = 2, . . . , k, where k ∈ N is arbitrary.
We may then apply the boundary condition V1,k(0) = 0 in order to show that
V1,k(vˆ) = V1,k(0) +
k∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
V
(j)
1,k (v
′) dv′j
=
∫ vˆ1
0
µ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′ − (1− δ)
k∑
j=2
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′.(4.8)
Applying Proposition 2 and some arithmetic manipulation to the above expression then
yields the desired result that
(4.9) Vl,k(vˆ) = δl−1
∫ vˆl
0
µl(v′)
ηl(v′)
dv′ − (1− δ)
k∑
j=l+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′.
To better understand this result, let us consider two “corner” cases. In particular, notice
that if q = 0 (that is, if no new buyers ever arrive on the market), then
Vl,k(vˆ) =
k∑
j=l
δj−1(vˆj − vˆj+1) for all l = 1, . . . , k and any k ∈ N,
where we define vˆk+1 = 0. Thus, the expected payoff to a buyer in this case is the dis-
counted difference between consecutively ranked valuations. Note that this is also ex-
actly the externality imposed by the l-th buyer on all those ranked below her when there
is no entry, as she postpones each one’s receipt of an object by exactly one period. On the
other hand, if δ = 1 and buyers are “infinitely patient,” then for any q, we have
Vl,k(vˆ) = vˆl for all l = 1, . . . , k and any k ∈ N.
In this case, buyers care only about their eventual receipt of an object, but not about
the timing of that event. Therefore, their bids are all equal to zero, and any random
assignment of objects leaves the buyers equally well off.
4.3. Equilibrium. With the characterization derived in Theorem 1, we may now refor-
mulate the bidding strategies from Equation 4.3 as
(4.10) βl,k(vi, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk) = vi − δl−1
∫ vi
0
µl−1(v′)
ηl−1(v′)
dv′ + (1− δ)
k∑
j=l+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−2(v′)
ηj−1(v′)
dv′.
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This expression allows us to demonstrate the properties of bids in the following
Proposition 3 (Information revelation and consistency of βl,k).
The buyers’ bids βl,k, where k ∈ N and l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, are strictly increasing in each buyers’ own
valuation. Furthermore, when the buyers use these bidding functions, the exit of a lower-ranked
bidder does not induce the immediate exit of any higher-ranked bidders.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that this proposition verifies our previous assumption that buyers’ values are re-
vealed after each round—since the bidding functions are strictly increasing in each buy-
ers’ own private valuation, the price at which they drop out of the auction is an invertible
function, thereby allowing the inference of their value by their competitors. Further-
more, since the bidding functions are “consistent,” a higher-ranked bidder remains in the
auction instead of immediately exiting after a lower-ranked bidder drops out, thereby
allowing the other buyers to (eventually) deduce their value.
Finally, it remains to be shown that the bidding strategies described in Equation 4.10
are in fact an equilibrium of this model. We have the following
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium verification).
Suppose that in each period, buyers bid according to the cutoff strategies
βl,k(vi, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk) = vi − δl−1
∫ vi
0
µl−1(v′)
ηl−1(v′)
dv′ + (1− δ)
k∑
j=l+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−2(v′)
ηj−1(v′)
dv′,
where k ∈ N is the number of bidders present on the market, and l ∈ {2, . . . , k} is the number
of active bidders remaining in the current period. This strategy profile forms a Markov perfect
equilibrium of this game.
Proof. Consider any period with k ∈ N buyers on the market, and fix an arbitrary bidder
i. Suppose that all bidders other than i are using the conjectured strategy. We must show
that bidder i has no incentive to make a one-shot deviation from the collection of bidding
functions {βl,k}kl=2.
Note first that if vi 6= vˆ1, dropping out of the auction early has no bearing on expected
future payoffs due to the memorylessness of the bidding strategies—in each period, the
process of information revelation is repeated, and hence a one-shot deviation to an early
exit will not affect the bidding behavior in future periods. On the other hand, suppose that
vi = vˆ1; that is, bidder i has the highest realized valuation among those bidders present on
the market. Following the conjectured equilibrium leads to a payoff of vˆ1−β2,k(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk),
while deviating and exiting at a lower price leads to the second-ranked bidder winning
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and a payoff to i of δV1,k−1(vˆ1, vˆ3, . . . , vˆk). Letting wˆ = (vˆ3, . . . , vˆk), we then have
vˆ1 − β2,k(vˆ2, wˆ)− δV1,k−1(vˆ1, wˆ) = vˆ1 − vˆ2 + δ (V1,k−1(v2, wˆ)− V1,k−1(v1, wˆ))
= vˆ1 − vˆ2 + δ
(∫ vˆ2
0
µ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′ −
∫ vˆ1
0
µ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′
)
=
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
η(v′)− δµ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′ =
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
(1− δ)
η(v′)
dv′.
Since vˆ1 > vˆ2 and η(v′) > 0 for all v′ ∈ R+, the above expression is strictly positive. Thus,
deviating and exiting the auction early leads to a strict decrease in utility if the realized
values are such that bidder i has the highest value, and does not affect payoffs otherwise.
On the other hand, bidder i also has available to her the option of remaining in the auc-
tion beyond the cutoffs specified in the conjectured equilibrium. If the realized values are
such that vi = vˆ1, delaying exit will have no effect, as the other bidders will drop out of the
auction earlier than i. If, on the other hand, vi = vˆl for some l > 1, then delaying exit may
have an effect on i’s payoffs. To be precise, if i exits before the eventual winner, her payoff
will remain unchanged (again, because behavior in future periods does not depend upon
the information revealed in the current period). Thus, in order to influence her payoff, i
must remain present in the auction until all other bidders have dropped out, thereby win-
ning the auction. Winning the auction yields a payoff of vˆl − β2,k(vˆ1, . . . , vˆl−1, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk),
while following the strategy in Equation 4.10 leads to an expected payoff of δVl−1,k−1.
Letting wˆ = (vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk) and vˆ−l = (vˆ1, . . . , vˆl−1, wˆ), we have
vˆl − β2,k(vˆ−l)− δVl−1,k−1(vˆl, wˆ) = vˆl − vˆ1 + δ (V1,k(vˆ1, . . . , vˆl−1, wˆ)− Vl−1,k−1(vˆl, wˆ))
= vˆl − vˆ1 + δ (V1,k(vˆ1, . . . , vˆl−1, wˆ)− V1,k−1(vˆl, . . . , vˆl, wˆ))
= vˆl − vˆ1 + δ
(∫ vˆ1
vˆl
µ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′
− (1− δ)
l−1∑
j=2
δj−2
∫ vˆj
vˆl
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′
)
=
∫ vˆ1
vˆl
δµ(v′)− η(v′)
η(v′)
dv′ − (1− δ)
l−1∑
j=2
δj−1
∫ vˆj
vˆl
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′
= −(1− δ)
l−1∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vˆj
vˆl
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′ < 0,
where the second line follows from Proposition 2, the third from Theorem 1, and the final
inequality from the fact that µ(v), η(v) > 0 for all v ∈ R+. Hence, deviating and exiting
the auction later than prescribed has no effect if i has the highest value, but may leads to
a strict decrease in utility if the realized values are such that vi < vˆ1.
INFORMATION REVELATION AND RANDOM ENTRY IN SEQUENTIAL ASCENDING AUCTIONS 17
Thus, we may conclude that bidder i has no incentive to make a one-shot deviation
from the collection of bidding functions {βl,k}kl=2 regardless of the realized values. Fur-
thermore, the choice of k throughout was arbitrary, implying that bidding according to
Equation 4.10 forms a Markov perfect equilibrium.
5. DYNAMIC VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM
Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) develop the dynamic contribution mechanism (also
referred to as the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism), a direct mechanism that
implements the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in
which agents receive private information over time. In particular, the mechanism that
they propose, agents receive in each period their marginal contribution to the social wel-
fare in a dynamic generalization of the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. In
this mechanism, the truthtelling strategy is incentive compatible and forms an ex-post
equilibrium. Moreover, the authors show that the sequential ascending auction yields an
identical implementation in the case of a scheduling problem with a fixed set of indepen-
dent tasks. Cavallo et al. (2007) pushes their model one step further, demonstrating that
dynamic VCG truthfully implements the socially efficient allocation in more general dy-
namic settings. In this section, we show that the equilibrium in the sequential ascending
auction discussed above is equivalent to the truthtelling equilibrium of the dynamic VCG
mechanism. In addition, we use the result of Cavallo et al. (2007) to characterize equi-
librium in the sequential ascending auction when objects are no longer available with
certainty in every period, and hence there may be (effectively) multiple new entrants par-
ticipating in a given auction.
5.1. Constant Availability of Objects. We first consider the model examined above in
which exactly one object is available for sale in every period. It is immediately obvious
that the socially efficient policy is to allocate each object to the buyer with the highest
valuation present on the market.7
Let us defineW0 to be the expected value to the social planner when there are no buyers
present on the market. Then, letting v¯ denote the expected value of the distribution F , we
have
W0 = q
∫ ∞
0
(v′ + δW0) dF (v′) + (1− q)δW0 = qv¯
1− δ .
Denoting by Wn(vˆ) the expected value to the social planner when there are n buyers with
values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn, we may recursively solve for the planner’s value function. In
particular, we have the following
7Since a new object arrives in every period and future entrants’ values are independent of the current state,
there is no benefit to not allocating the object in any particular period. Furthermore, allocating an object to
a lower-valued buyer is inefficient due to the fact that the common discount factor δ is smaller than one.
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Proposition 4 (Planner’s payoff function).
The social planner’s payoff at the beginning of a period in which there are n buyers present on the
market with values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn is given by
(5.1) Wn(vˆ) = W0 +
n∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vˆj
0
(
µ(v′)
η(v′)
)j
dv′.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, and may therefore be found in the appen-
dix.
Effectively, this theorem yields an analogue to the social planner’s payoff in the case of
a fixed number of buyers without any entry. With n buyers whose values are given by
v1 > · · · > vn, the efficient allocation yields a value to the planner given by
n∑
j=1
δj−1vj.
In our setting, however, potential entrants can and do rearrange the efficient allocation,
postponing the time at which buyers with lower valuations receive an object. Thus, their
contribution to social welfare must take this effect into account. So, consider the buyer
with the highest valuation vˆ1. If we increase his valuation by some infintesimal amount,
the planner gains an equal amount with probability 1− q(1− F (vˆ1)), the probability that
no new entrant arrives with a higher value. On the other hand, with the complementary
probability q(1− F (vˆ1)), assignment of the object to our buyer (and the realization of the
planner’s gain) is postponed. Thus, the benefit from the increase in vˆ1 is
(1− q(1− F (vˆ1))) + q(1− F (vˆ1))δ [(1− q(1− F (vˆ1))) + q(1− F (vˆ1))δ · · · ]
=
∞∑
m=0
(δq(1− F (vˆ1)))m (1− q(1− F (vˆ1)) = 1− q(1− F (vˆ1))
1− δq(1− F (vˆ1)) .
Integrating this ratio therefore captures the total contribution (relative to assigning the
object to a buyer with value 0) of the high-value buyer. Analogous reasoning follows for
the remaining buyers.
We may then use this result to provide an interpretation for the buyer payoff functions
characterized in Theorem 1. In particular, each buyer’s expected payoff at any point in
time is simply her marginal contribution to the social welfare. This is stated formally as
Theorem 3 (Relationship between V and W ).
For any n ∈ N and any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the expected payoff of the k-th ranked buyer is equal to
her marginal contribution to the social welfare; that is,
(5.2) Vk,n(vˆ) = Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−k).
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Proof. The proof proceeds via straightforward arithmetic:
Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−k) =
[
W0 +
n∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vˆj
0
µj(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′
]
−
[
W0 +
k−1∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vˆj
0
µj(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′ +
n∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−1(v′)
ηj−1(v′)
dv′
]
= δk−1
∫ vˆk
0
µk(v′)
ηk(v′)
dv′ +
n∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
(
δ
µj(v′)
ηj(v′)
− µ
j−1(v′)
ηj−1(v′)
)
dv′
= δk−1
∫ vˆk
0
µk(v′)
ηk(v′)
dv′ − (1− δ)
n∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′
= Vk,n(vˆ).
Note that we may rewrite this marginal contribution to social welfare in terms of the
revised scheduling of future assignments. In particular, the removal of the k-th highest
buyer from the market does not affect the order in which those with higher values receive
objects. However, all those who would receive objects after the k-th highest buyer now
receive objects one period prior to when they otherwise would have. Thus, we may write
Vk,n(vˆ) =
n∑
j=k
δj−1
∫ vˆj
0
µj(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′ −
n∑
j=k+1
δj−2
∫ vˆj
0
µj−1(v′)
ηj−1(v′)
dv′
=
n∑
j=k
δj−1
(∫ vˆj
0
µj(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′ −
∫ vˆj+1
0
µj(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′
)
=
n∑
j=k
δj−1
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
µj(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′,(5.3)
where vˆn+1 is defined to be equal to zero. Thus, the marginal contribution of a buyer,
and hence their expected payoff in the equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction
game, is exactly the difference in the scheduling of object assignments to those bidders
who have lower values.
Moreover, this demonstrates the equivalence between the dynamic marginal contri-
bution mechanism and the sequential ascending auction in this setting. Not only are
continuation payoffs identical in the two settings, but the timing of payments and object
allocations are also the same.
5.2. Random Arrival of Objects. We now consider a generalization of the setting of the
previous sections. Instead of a single object arriving with certainty in every period, we
now allow the arrival of objects to be probabilistic. In particular, at most one object arrives
on the market in each period with probability p ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the number of buyers
present on the market may increase between auctions, as it is possible for multiple new
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buyers to arrive before another object becomes available for sale.8 Notice that the socially
efficient policy remains unchanged from the previous section—when available, objects
should be allocated to the highest-valued buyer currently present on the market.
Once again, we denote by Wn(vˆ) the expected value to the social planner when there
are n buyers present at the beginning of a period with (ordered) values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn. Wn
must satisfy the relationship given by
Wn(vˆ) = pq
[
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
(vˆ1 + δWn(ˆˆv−1(v′))) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
(v′ + δWn(vˆ)) dF (v′)
]
+ p(1− q) [vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1)] + (1− p)q
[
n∑
j=0
δ
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
Wn+1(ˆˆv(v
′)) dF (v′)
]
(5.4)
+ (1− p)(1− q) [δWn(vˆ)] .
Define λ : R+ → [0, 1] by
λ(v) =
1− δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))]
2δ(1− p)q(1− F (v))
−
√
1− 2δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))] + δ2 (1− p− q(1− F (v)))2
2δ(1− p)q(1− F (v)) .
Then we have the following
Proposition 5 (Planner’s payoffs with random object arrivals).
The social planner’s expected payoff at the beginning of a period in which there are n buyers present
on the market with values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn and objects arrive randomly is given by
(5.5) Wn(vˆ) = W0 + δ−1
n∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′,
where W0 is a constant equal to the planner’s payoff when no buyers are present on the market.
Proof. The proof may be found in the appendix.
Thus, as in the case in which objects arrive deterministically in every period, the plan-
ner’s expected payoff is an additively separable sum of contributions from each buyer
present on the market, where the magnitude of each contribution is inversely propor-
tional to the buyer’s rank amongst her competitors (and hence the amount of time before
the contribution is realized). Although λ is not as straightforward to interpret as the ratio
µ
η
, it reflects the anticipated marginal benefit from increasing the value of the highest-
ranked buyer, taking into account the fact that multiple new entrants may arrive before
8Note that this assumption not only leads to a more general competitive environment amongst buyers, but
also leads to a greater expected delay before the assignment of an object to any given market participant.
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the next object arrives, thereby delaying the realization of the increase to the social welfare
from the increase in vˆ1.
Notice that our setting satisfies the conditions discussed by Cavallo et al. (2007) for
the incentive compatible and truthful implementation of the socially efficient policy by
the dynamic marginal contribution mechanism.9 Thus, using the social planner’s payoffs
from Proposition 5, we may construct contingent transfers such that truthful revelation
of private values is an ex post equilibrium in this dynamic game. In particular, at every
point in time, each buyer receives a transfer equal to their “flow marginal contribution”
in that period. This is defined as the social welfare excluding the player in question when
making the allocation that is efficient given her existence, less the total welfare of all other
players when acting as though the player in question is not present on the market.
To make this clearer, consider a buyer i with value vi who is present on the market,
and suppose that there are n other buyers present on the market with (ordered) values
vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn. Let us suppose first that vi > vˆ1. Thus, if an object is available, the
efficient policy involves assigning the object to buyer i, yielding her a flow payoff of vi.
Furthermore, i should receive a transfer equal to her marginal contribution to the social
welfare, less the current-period utility she receives; this transfer may be written as
(5.6) (0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= −vˆ1 + δ (Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−1)) .
On the other hand, if an object is not available, i cannot be allocated an object in the
current period. Therefore, i receives a payoff of
(0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= 0.
Suppose on the other hand that i does not have the highest value. If an object is avail-
able, she will not receive it; however, she will receive a transfer of
(vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= 0.
If no object is available, i still does not receive an object, and is given a transfer of
(0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= 0.
In future periods, i (again) receives no transfers until she is eventually the highest-ranked
buyer, as her flow marginal contribution remains zero until that point.
9In particular, their Theorem 6 applies to the present model.
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Thus, a buyer’s expected continuation payoff at every point in time in this dynamic
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is given by her marginal contribution to the social
welfare. Therefore, by choosing bidding functions that yield continuation payoffs equal
to these marginal contributions, we will have constructed an equilibrium of the sequential
ascending auction game. So, letting Vk,n denote the expected payoff to a buyer with the
k-th highest of the n values present at the beginning of a period, we define
(5.7) Vk,n(vˆ) := Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−k) = δ−1
n∑
j=k
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
λj(v′) dv′
In addition, denoting by βk,n the drop-out point of a bidder when there are k active bid-
ders in an auction with n buyers, define
βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) := vi − δVk−1,n−1(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn).
We have the following
Theorem 4 (Auction equilibrium with random object arrivals).
Suppose that in each period in which an object is available, buyers bid according to the cutoff
strategies
(5.8) βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆk) = vi −
∫ vi
vˆk+1
λk−1(v′) dv′ −
n∑
j=k+1
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′,
where n ∈ N is the number of buyers present on the market, and k ∈ {2, . . . , n} is the number of
active bidders remaining in the current period, and vˆn+1 = 0. Then this strategy profile forms an
efficient and fully revealing Markov perfect equilibrium of this game.10
Proof. Note first that βk,n is strictly increasing in vi for all k and n; in particular, since
λ(v′) ∈ (0, 1) for all v′ ∈ R+,
∂
∂vi
βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) = 1− λk−1(vi) > 0.
Furthermore, notice that
βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn)− βk+1,n(vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) = vi − vˆk+1 −
∫ vi
vˆk+1
λk−1(v′) dv′
=
∫ vi
vˆk+1
dv′ −
∫ vi
vˆk+1
λk−1(v′) dv′
=
∫ vi
vˆk+1
(
1− λk−1(v′)) dv′ > 0
10Notice that we have constructed equilibrium strategies in the sequential auction game by using the pay-
offs of the dynamic marginal contribution mechanism. A simple adaptation of this argument provides an
alternate proof of Theorem 2.
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whenever vi > vˆk+1. Thus, a lower-ranked bidder’s exit from an auction does not in-
duce the immediate exit of a higher-ranked bidder, implying that following the bidding
strategies in Equation 5.8 is efficient and fully revealing of all private information.
Note that in the sequential ascending auction game, buyers do not make any payments
unless they win an auction. Moreover, when they do win, they make a payment equal to
the drop-out point of their last remaining opponent in that auction. Following the bidding
strategies defined in Equation 5.8 implies that a bidder with value vi > vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn,
when engaged in an auction, will win the auction and make a payment of
β2,n+1(vˆ) = vˆ1 − δV1,n(vˆ) = vˆ1 − δ (Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−1)) ,
where the second equality comes from the definition of Vk,n in Equation 5.7. Notice that
this payment is exactly the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves transfer described in Equa-
tion 5.6. Thus, following the bidding strategies of Equation 5.8 yields exactly the payoffs
of truthful reporting in the direct mechanism.
Finally, suppose that some player i with value vi has an incentive to deviate from the
bidding strategy. Since the cutoff bids are fully revealing, this is equivalent to i bidding as
though her value were v′i 6= vi. Since the bidding strategies yield the same payoffs as the
dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, this implies that player i has an incentive to
misreport her type to the social planner. However, truthtelling is incentive compatible in
every period of that direct mechanism, a contradiction. Thus, no player has an incentive
to deviate—all players bidding according to the cutoff values given by Equation 5.8 is a
Markov perfect equilibrium of the sequential ascending auction game.
Not only does Theorem 4 characterize an efficient, fully revealing, and symmetric equi-
librium of the sequential ascending auction game, it also generalizes the equivalence re-
sult of the previous subsection; in a setting with random arrivals of both buyers and ob-
jects, the sequential ascending auction serves as a straightforward and intuitive indirect
mechanism that is equivalent to the dynamic marginal contribution mechanism.
6. DISCUSSION
This paper solves for a Markov perfect equilibrium in a model of online auctions.
In particular, we show that in sequential ascending auctions, objects are allocated effi-
ciently in a manner that employs the truthful revelation of private information. More-
over, the bidding strategy employed by buyers in this equilibrium has the remarkable
property of being robust to the random entry of new buyers whose valuations are pri-
vate information—in each period, all private information is revealed anew, and hence
there is no incentive for new entrants to attempt to manipulate the outcome of future
24 MAHER SAID
periods by altering the information that they (truthfully) reveal upon their entry. Further-
more, we show that the sequential ascending auction in this setting is equivalent to the
dynamic marginal contribution mechanism developed and characterized by Bergemann
and Välimäki (2007) and Cavallo et al. (2007).
There are several interesting avenues for future research in this area. For example,
it would be desirable to have a fully developed model of seller behavior and competi-
tion in “overlapping” auctions, as well as introducing some notion of endogenous arrival
and entry deterrence. Another important question regards the usefulness of sequential
ascending auctions as an indirect mechanism that implements socially efficient policies
when agents are not constrained to have single-unit demand. Bergemann and Välimäki
(2007) provide an example that demonstrates the failure of the sequential ascending auc-
tion in implementing the efficient policy in one such setting; it would be useful to under-
stand how this example may be generalized. These questions are, however, left for future
work.
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APPENDIX
In order to prove Proposition 1, we will make heavy use of the following result regard-
ing closed subsets of the set of continuous real-valued functions on a Euclidean space. So,
let C(Rn+) denote the set of all continuous real-valued functions on Rn+ endowed with the
sup-metric topology. Furthermore, letCk(Rn+) denote the set of all continuous real-valued
functions on Rn+ that do not depend on their first k ≤ n arguments. We have the following
Lemma 1 (Ck(Rn+) is closed).
For any k ≤ n, Ck(Rn+) is a closed subset of C(Rn+).
Proof. Fix any convergent sequence {fm}∞m=1 in Ck(Rn+), and let f ∗ ∈ C(Rn+) denote the
limit of this sequence. Suppose that there exist distinct x, y ∈ Rn+ such that xi = yi for
i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n, but
 := |f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| > 0.
Since uniform convergence implies point-wise convergence and fm converges to f ∗,
there exists Mx ∈ N such that |fm(x) − f ∗(x)| < 2 for all m > Mx. SImilarly, there exists
My ∈ N such that |fm(y)−f ∗(y)| < 2 for allm > My. Therefore, for anym > max{Mx,My},
 = |f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| ≤ |f ∗(x)− fm(x)|+ |fm(x)− fm(y)|+ |fm(y)− f ∗(y)|
<

2
+ 0 +

2
= ,
a contradiction. Note that the first inequality above follows from the triangle inequality,
and the second is due to the fact that fm ∈ Ck(Rn+) implies fm(x) = fm(y). Thus, we must
have f ∗(x) = f ∗(y); that is, f ∗ ∈ Ck(Rn+).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let vˆ ∈ Rk+ denote the ordered vector of values of those bidders
present at the beginning of the period, and suppose that they are commonly known. Fur-
thermore, suppose that all buyers use the bidding strategies described in Equation 4.3. If
there are no entrants, then the highest-valued buyer (without loss of generality, bidder 1)
wins the object, and pays the price
β2,k(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk) = vˆ2 − δV1,k−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk).
On the other hand, if a new entrant enters with value v′, bidder 1 may no longer win
the object. Furthermore, even if she does win, the price she pays will depend upon the
realization of v′. In particular, we may write the expected payoff of bidder 1 as
V1,k(vˆ) = (1− q) [vˆ1 − β2,k(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk)]
+ q
[
k−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
(
vˆ1 − β2,k+1(ˆˆv−1(v′))
)
dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δV1,k(vˆ) dF (v
′)
]
,
(A.1)
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where ˆˆv(v′) is the ordered vector of values including the new entrant, and we define
vˆk+1 := 0. The first term (multiplied by 1− q) is bidder 1’s payoff when no entrant arrives,
while the second term is the (probability-weighted) sum of the payoffs for each possible
realized ranking of the entrant.
Substituting the definition of β2,k and β2,k+1 from Equation 4.3 and simplifying, we see
that V1,k is defined as the fixed point of the operator T1,k : C(Rk+)→ C(Rk+) defined by
[T1,k(W )](vˆ) := (1− q) [vˆ1 − vˆ2 + δV1,k−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk))]
+ q
[∫ vˆ1
0
vˆ1 dF (v
′)−
∫ vˆ2
0
vˆ2 dF (v
′)−
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
v′ dF (v′)
+ δ
k−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
W (ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δW (vˆ) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.2)
Fix any W,W ′ ∈ C(Rk+) such that W ≥ W ′. Then
[T1,k(W )− T1,k(W ′)](vˆ) = δq
[ ∑k−1
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
[W −W ′](ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+(1− F (vˆ1))[W −W ′](vˆ)
]
≥ 0.
In addition, for any W ∈ C(Rk+) and any α ∈ R++,
[T1,k(W + α)](vˆ) = [T1,k(W )](vˆ) + δqα.
Thus, T1,k satisfies the monotonicity and discounting conditions of Blackwell’s Contrac-
tion Lemma, and hence we may apply the Banach Fixed Point Theorem to show that V1,k
is the unique fixed point of T1,k.11
Now consider V2,n. Suppose (again without loss of generality) that bidder 1 has the
second-highest of the k values; that is, that vˆ2 = v1. If there are no new entrants, then
bidder 1 loses the auction, but has the highest value in the next period. On the other
hand, if a new entrant arrives, bidder 1 will still lose the auction. However, in the next
period, her ranking depends on the realization of the new entrant’s value. Thus, we may
write her payoff as the fixed point of the operator T2,k : C(Rk+)→ C(Rk+) defined by
[T2,k(W )](vˆ) = δ(1− q)V1,k−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk) + q
[
k−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
δV1,k(ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
δW (ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δW (vˆ) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.3)
Applying exactly the same technique and steps as with T1,n, we see that T2,n is a contrac-
tion mapping on C(Rk+). Notice that T2,k in fact maps elements of C1(Rk+) into C1(Rk+)
11See Section C.6 of Ok (2007) for precise statements of the results we are applying.
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itself; thus, applying Lemma 1, the unique fixed point of T2,n does not depend upon
its first argument. We may therefore, with a slight abuse of notation, write V2,k(vˆ) =
V2,k(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk).
Now consider any arbitrary l such that 1 < l ≤ k, and suppose that Vl−1,k ∈ Cl−2(Rk+).
Then Vl,k is given by a fixed point of the operator Tl,k : C(Rk+) → C(Rk+), where Tl,k is
defined by
[Tl,k(W )](vˆ) = δ(1− q)Vl−1,k−1(vˆl, . . . , vˆk) + q
[
k−l∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
δVl−1,k(ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+
k−1∑
j=k−l+1
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
δW (ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δW (vˆ) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.4)
We may again apply Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theo-
rem to show that Vl,k is the unique fixed point of Tl,k. Furthermore, it is straightforward
to show that Tl,k maps elements of Cl−1(Rk+) back into Cl−1(Rk+). Therefore, again using
Lemma 1, we may write Vl,k(vˆ) = Vl,k(vˆl, . . . , vˆk).
Thus, by induction, the bidding strategies in Equation 4.3 lead to unique value func-
tions
{
{Vj,k}kj=1
}∞
k=1
such that, for all k and all j ≤ k, Vj,k ∈ Cj−1(Rk+).
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall from Equation A.2 in the proof of Proposition 1 that V1,k is
defined as the unique fixed point of
[T1,k(W )](vˆ) := (1− q) [vˆ1 − vˆ2 + δV1,k−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk))]
+ q
[∫ vˆ1
0
vˆ1 dF (v
′)−
∫ vˆ2
0
vˆ2 dF (v
′)−
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
v′ dF (v′)
+ δ
k−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
W (ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δW (vˆ) dF (v′)
]
.
Let wˆ := vˆ−1. Then
V1,k(wˆ) = [T1,k(V1,k)](wˆ) = δ(1− q)V1,k−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk)
+ δq
[
k−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
V1,k( ˆˆw(v
′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ2
δV1,k(wˆ) dF (v
′)
]
.
However, this is identical to the definition of T2,k given in Equation A.3, implying that,
for all k ∈ N, V1,k(vˆ2, vˆ2, . . . , vˆk) = V2,k(vˆ2, . . . , vˆk).
Fix l > 1, and suppose that Vl−1,k(vˆl, vˆl, . . . , vˆk) = Vl,k(vˆl, . . . , vˆk) for all k ≥ l. Redefine
wˆ := ( ˆl + 1, ˆl + 1, . . . , vˆk), and consider Vl,k(wˆ). Recalling from Equation A.4 the definition
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of Tl,k, we have
Vl,k(wˆ) = [Tl,k(Vl,k)](wˆ) = δ(1− q)Vl−1,k−1(vˆl+1, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk)
+ q
[
k−l∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
δVl−1,k( ˆˆw(v′)) dF (v′)
+
k−1∑
j=k−l+1
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
δVl,k( ˆˆw(v
′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δVl,k(wˆ) dF (v
′)
]
= δ(1− q)Vl,k−1(vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk)
+ q
[
k−l−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆk−j
vˆk−j+1
δVl,k( ˆˆw(v
′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆl+1
δVl,k(wˆ) dF (v
′)
]
.
The above is a reformulation of the expression for Tl+1,k, taking into account that the
fixed point of this operator lies in Cl(Rk+). Since Vl,k(wˆ) is a fixed point of the operator,
the uniqueness result from Proposition 1 implies that Vl+1,k(vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk) = Vl,k(wˆ) for all
k ≥ l + 1.
Thus, by induction on l, we have established that, for arbitrary k ∈ N and for all l =
1, . . . , k, Vl,k(vˆl, . . . , vˆk) = V1,k(vˆl, . . . , vˆl, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk).
Proof of Proposition 3. To prove the first part of this proposition, it suffices to simply differ-
entiate the bid function βl,k with respect to the bidder’s value vi. In particular, we have,
for all k ∈ N and l ∈ {1, . . . , k},
∂
∂vi
βl,k(vi, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk) = 1−
(
δ
µ(vi)
η(vi)
)l−1
.
However, δ ∈ (0, 1) implies µ(v)
η(v)
∈ (0, 1), and hence ∂
∂vi
βl,k(vi, vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk) > 0.
As for the second part of this proposition, let wˆ = (vˆl+1, . . . , vˆk) and note that
βl,k(vi, wˆ)− βl+1,k(wˆ) = vi − δVl−1,k−1(vi, wˆ)− vˆl+1 + δVl,k−1(wˆ)
= (vi − vˆl+1)− δ(V1,k−1(vi, . . . , vi, wˆ)− V1,k−1(vˆl+1, . . . , vˆl+1, wˆ))
= (vi − vˆl+1)− δ
[∫ vi
vˆl+1
µ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′ − (1− δ)
l∑
j=2
δj−2
∫ vi
vˆl+1
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′
]
=
∫ vi
vˆl+1
η(v′)− δµ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′ + (1− δ)
l∑
j=2
δj−1
∫ vi
vˆl+1
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′
= (1− δ)
l∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vi
vˆl+1
µj−1(v′)
ηj(v′)
dv′.
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Since µ(v), η(v) > 0 for all v ∈ R+, this expression is positive if, and only if, vi > vˆl+1. Thus,
the exit of a lower-ranked bidder does not induce the immediate exit of a higher-ranked
bidder who is using the bidding strategy given in Equation 4.10.
Proof of Proposition 4. We begin by showing thatW1 has the desired form and then proceed
inductively. Note that W1 is a fixed point of the operator Tˆ1 : C(R+)→ C(R+) defined by
(A.5) [Tˆ (g)](x) = (1− q)(x+ δW0) + q
[∫ x
0
(x+ δg(y)) dF (y) +
∫ ∞
x
(y + δg(x)) dF (y)
]
.
This operator is clearly a self-map from C(R+) into itself. Furthermore, it is straightfor-
ward to see that Tˆ1 is a contraction mapping. Fix any g, g′ ∈ C(R+) such that g′ > g.
Then
[Tˆ1(g
′ − g)](x) = δq
[∫ x
0
(g′(y)− g(y)) dF (y) + (1− F (x))(g′(x)− g(x))
]
> 0.
Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(R+) and any α ∈ R++,
[Tˆ1(g + α)](x) = [Tˆ1(g)](x) + δqα.
Since δq < 1, we may apply Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point
Theorem, implying that Tˆ1 has a unique fixed point W1 such that
W1(vˆ1) = (1− q)(vˆ1 + δW0) + q
[∫ vˆ
0
(vˆ + δW1(v
′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ
(v′ + δW1(vˆ)) dF (v′)
]
.
Differentiating this expression with respect to vˆ1 yields
W ′1(vˆ1) = (1− q) + qF (vˆ1) + δq(1− F (vˆ))W ′1(vˆ) =
µ(vˆ1)
η(vˆ1)
.
Finally, note that W1(0) = W0, since a buyer with value zero adds nothing to the social
welfare. Therefore, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we have
(A.6) W1(vˆ1) = W0 +
∫ vˆ1
0
µ(v′)
η(v′)
dv′.
Now consider Wn(vˆ) for arbitrary n > 1, and suppose that Wn−1 takes the desired
form.12 Wn is defined to be a fixed point of the operator Tˆn : C(Rn+)→ C(Rn+) defined by
[Tˆn(g)](x) = (1− q)(x1 + δWn−1(x−1))
+ q
[ n−1∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
(x1 + δg(x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn)) dF (y)
+
∫ ∞
x1
(y + δg(x)) dF (y)
]
.
(A.7)
12Notice that this implies that all of the cross-derivatives of Wn−1 are identically zero.
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Note that for any g, g′ ∈ C(Rn+) such that g′ > g, we have
[Tˆn(g
′ − g)](x) = δq
[ n−1∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
[g′ − g](x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn) dF (y)
+ (1− F (x1)(g′(x)− g(x))
]
.
Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(Rn+) and any α ∈ R++,
[Tˆn(g + α)](x) = [Tˆn(g)](x) + δqα.
Since δq < 1, Blackwell’s monotonicity and discounting conditions are satisfied. Thus,
Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theorem imply that Tˆn has a
unique fixed point Wn such that
Wn(vˆ) = (1− q)(vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))
+ q
[ n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
(vˆ1 + δWn(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn−j, v′, vˆn−j+1, . . . , vˆn)) dF (v′)
+
∫ ∞
vˆ1
(v′ + δWn(vˆ)) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.8)
Differentiating this expression implicitly with respect to vˆ1 yields
W (1)n (vˆ) = (1− q) + qF (vˆ1) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))W (1)n (vˆ) =
µ(vˆ1)
η(vˆ1)
.
Note that this expression is independent of n and of vˆj for j 6= 1, implying that W (1,j)n is
identically zero for all j 6= 1.
Similarly, implicit differentiation with respect to vˆ2 yields
W (2)n (vˆ) = (1− q)δW (1)n−1(vˆ−1) + δq
[ n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (1)n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
W (2)n (v
′, vˆ) dF (v′) + (1− F (vˆ1))W (2)n (vˆ)
]
,
where ˆˆv(vˆ) is the re-ordering of vˆ and v′. Since W 1,jn is identically zero,
n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (1)n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) = F (vˆ2)
µ(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
.
Furthermore, W (2,1)n = 0 implies that∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
W (2)n (v
′, vˆ) dF (v′) + (1− F (vˆ1))W (2)n (vˆ) = (1− F (vˆ2))W (2)n (vˆ).
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Finally, our inductive hypothesis implies that
W
(1)
n−1(vˆ−1) =
µ(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
.
Thus, we may conclude that
(A.9) W (2)n = δ(1− q)
µ(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
+ δq
[
F (vˆ2)
µ(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
+ (1− F (vˆ2))W (2)n (vˆ)
]
= δ
(
µ(vˆ2)
η(vˆ2)
)2
.
Once again, note that this expression is independent of n and of vˆj for j 6= 2, implying
that W 2,jn is identically zero for all j 6= 2.
Proceeding inductively, consider the derivative ofWn with respect to its k-th argument,
where k ≤ n. We have
W (k)n (vˆ) = (1− q)δW (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1) + δq
[ n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (1)n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+
n−1∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (k)n (
ˆˆv1(v
′)) dF (v′) + (1− F (vˆ1))W (k)n (vˆ)
]
.
Applying the same simplifications as above, we have
W (k)n = δ(1− q)W (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1) + δq
[
F (vˆk)W
(k−1)
n−1 (vˆ−1) + (1− F (vˆk))W (k)n (vˆ)
]
=
δµ(vˆk)
η(vˆk)
W
(k−1)
n−1 (vˆ−1)
= δk−1
(
µ(vˆk)
η(vˆk)
)k
.(A.10)
Finally, note that Wn(0, . . . , 0) = W0 since, as with one agent with value zero, assigning
an object to a “null” agent yields no increase in social welfare. Thus, we may conclude
that, as desired,
(A.11) Wn(vˆ) = W0 +
n∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vˆj
0
(
µ(v′)
η(v′)
)j
dv′.
In order to prove Proposition 5, we will need to make use of the following result.
Lemma 2 (W is Additively Separable).
The social planner’s expected payoff function in the case of random object arrivals is an additively
separable function of the (ordered) values of the the buyers present on the market.
Proof. Recall that the socially optimal policy in this setting is for the planner to assign
an object—whenever it is available—to the highest-valued buyer on the market. Since
the arrival process of new buyers and the realized valuations of these new entrants are
independent of the number of agents present on the market, a marginal increase in the
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value of the highest-valued buyer present on the market does not affect the planner’s
expectations of future realized values, nor does it impact the anticipated plan of object
assignments. Therefore, for any values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn > vˆn+1, we must have
∂
∂vˆ1
Wn(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) =
∂
∂vˆ1
Wn+1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn+1).
Similarly, for any k = 2, . . . , n, a marginal increase in vˆk, the value of the k-th highest-
ranked buyer, affects neither future arrivals and valuations nor the planner’s optimal
plan of action. Therefore, we must have
∂
∂vˆk
Wn(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) =
∂
∂vˆk
Wn+1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn+1).
Thus, for any n ∈ N and any k = 1, . . . , n,
(A.12) W (k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = W
(k)
n+1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn, vˆn+1),
where vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn > vˆn+1.
Now consider any n ∈ N and ordered values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn. Equation A.12 implies that
W (1)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = W
(1)
n−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−1) = W
(1)
n−2(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−2) = · · · = W (1)1 (vˆ1).
Therefore, it must be the case that
W
(1,2)
2 (vˆ1, vˆ2) =
∂
∂vˆ2
W
(1)
2 (vˆ1, vˆ2) =
∂
∂vˆ2
W
(1)
1 (vˆ1) = 0.
Straightforward induction therefore yields
W
(1,k)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(1)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(1)
k−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆk−1) = 0
for all k = 2, . . . , n. Hence, it must be the case that, for any k 6= 1, W (1)k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) is a
function of vˆ1 alone.
Since Equation A.12 implies that
W (2)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = W
(2)
n−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−1) = W
(2)
n−2(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−2) = · · · = W (2)2 (vˆ1, vˆ2),
we may perform a similar exercise as above. In particular,
W
(2,3)
3 (vˆ1, vˆ2, vˆ3) =
∂
∂vˆ3
W
(2)
3 (vˆ1, vˆ2, vˆ3) =
∂
∂vˆ3
W
(2)
2 (vˆ1, vˆ2) = 0.
The same inductive reasoning again leads to the conclusion that
W
(2,k)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(2)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(2)
k−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆk−1) = 0
for all k = 3, . . . , n. Combining this with the fact that W (1)k is independent of its second
argument yields the conclusion that W (2)k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) is a function of vˆ2 alone. Proceeding
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inductively in this manner, we may conclude that
(A.13) W (j,k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = 0 for all j 6= k,
where j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Thus, Equation A.13 implies that, for any n ∈ N and any k = 1, . . . , n, we may write
W (k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = gk,n(vˆk)
for some real-valued function gk,n. Combining this with Equation A.12 immediately im-
plies that
gk,n = gk,m for all m ≥ n.
Therefore, there exists a sequence of real-valued functions {gk}∞k=1 such that
W (k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = gk(vˆk)
for every k = 1, . . . , n and arbitrary n ∈ N. Therefore, applying the Fundamental Theorem
of Calculus allows us to conclude that, for arbitrary n,
(A.14) Wn(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = Wn(0, . . . , 0) +
n∑
k=1
∫ vˆk
0
gk(v
′) dv′;
that is, Wn is additively separable in its arguments.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that we may rewrite Equation 5.4 as
Wn(vˆ) = pq
[
F (vˆ1)vˆ1 +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
v′ dF (v′) + δ
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
Wn(ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) + δ(1− F (vˆ1))Wn(vˆ)
]
+ p(1− q) [vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1)] + (1− p)q
[
n∑
j=0
δ
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
Wn+1(ˆˆv(v
′)) dF (v′)
]
+ (1− p)(1− q) [δWn(vˆ)] .
Differentiating this expression with respect to vˆ1 yields
W (1)n (vˆ) = p[1− q(1− F (vˆ1))] + δ[pq(1− F (vˆ1)) + (1− p)(1− q)]W (1)n (vˆ)
+ δ(1− p)q
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W
(1)
n+1(
ˆˆv(v′)) dF (v′) + δ(1− p)q
∫ ∞
vˆ1
W
(2)
n+1(v
′, vˆ) dF (v′).
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Similarly, differentiating Wn(vˆ) with respect to vˆk for k > 1 yields
W (k)n (vˆ) = δpq
[
n−k−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (k−1)n (ˆˆv−1(v
′)) dF (v′) +
n−1∑
j=n−k
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (k)n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
]
+ δpq(1− F (vˆ1))W (k)n (vˆ) + δ(1− p)q
[
n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W
(k)
n+1(
ˆˆv(v′)) dF (v′)
]
+ δ(1− p)q
[
n∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W
(k+1)
n+1 (
ˆˆv(v′)) dF (v′)
]
+ δp(1− q)W (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1)
+ δ(1− p)(1− q)W (k)n (vˆ).
Applying Lemma 2 allows us to denote W (m)n (vˆ) by gm(vˆm), where m,n ∈ N and m ≤ n.
Thus, we may rewrite the two expressions above as
g1(v) = δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))] g1(v)
+ δ(1− p)q(1− F (v))g2(v) + p [1− q(1− F (v))]
(A.15)
and, for k > 1,
gk(v) = δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))] gk(v)
+ δ(1− p)q(1− F (v))gk+1(v) + δp [1− q(1− F (v))] gk−1(v).
(A.16)
Note, however, that Equation A.16 also holds for k = 1 if we define
g0(v) :=
1
δ
for all v ∈ R+.
Thus, the partial derivatives of Wn are determined by a second-order difference equation.
Defining
ym(v) =
[
gm+1(v)
gm(v)
]
and A(v) =
[
a(v) b(v)
1 0
]
,
where
a(v) =
1− δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))]
δ(1− p)q(1− F (v)) and b(v) = −
δp [1− q(1− F (v))]
δ(1− p)q(1− F (v)) ,
we may rewrite this difference equation as the first-order system
ym+1(v) = A(v)ym(v).
Induction immediately yields the solution
(A.17) ym(v) = [A(v)]
m y0(v).
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We denote by λ1(v) and λ2(v) the eigenvalues of A(v); in fact, these can be shown to
take the form
λ1(v) =
a(v)−√a2(v) + 4b(v)
2
and λ2(v) =
a(v) +
√
a2(v) + 4b(v)
2
.
Furthermore, since p, q, δ ∈ (0, 1) and F (v) ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ R+, arithmetic manipulation
yields
λ2(v) > 1 > λ1(v) > 0 for all v ∈ R+.
Finally, note that A(v) is diagonalizable, and, moreover,
[A(v)]m =
1
λ2(v)− λ1(v)
[
λm+12 (v)− λm+11 (v) λm+11 (v)λ2(v)− λ1(v)λm+12 (v)
λm2 (v)− λm1 (v) λm1 (v)λ2(v)− λ1(v)λm2 (v)
]
.
Thus, Equation A.17 may be rewritten as
gm(v) =
1
λ2(v)− λ1(v) [(λ
m
2 (v)− λm1 (v)) g1(v) + (λm1 (v)λ2(v)− λ1(v)λm2 (v)) g0(v)]
=
λm2 (v)
λ2(v)− λ1(v) (g1(v)− λ1(v)g0(v)) +
λm1 (v)
λ2(v)− λ1(v) (λ2(v)g0(v)− g1(v)) .(A.18)
Since λ2(v) > 1, the first term in Equation A.18 is divergent unless
g1(v) = λ1(v)g0(v).
Such a divergence would, of course, be contradictory; the marginal impact of an increase
of the m-th highest value on the social welfare must be bounded above by δm−1, as the
benefit of this increase is not realized for at least m periods. Thus,
(A.19) gm(v) = λm1 (v)g0(v).
Recalling that Wmn (vˆ) = gm(vˆm) and that g0(v) = δ−1, application of Lemma 2 allows us to
conclude that
(A.20) Wn(vˆ) = Wn(0) + δ−1
n∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
λj1(v
′) dv′.
Finally, note that any agent with a “null” value adds nothing to the social welfare, and
hence the planner’s payoff when they are not present is given by Wn(0) = W0, where
W0 = pq
[∫ ∞
0
(v′ + δW0) dF (v′)
]
+ p(1− q) [δW0]
+ (1− p)q
[∫ ∞
0
δW1(v
′) dF (v′)
]
+ (1− p)(1− q) [δW0]
=
q
1− δ
[
p
∫ ∞
0
v′ dF (v′) + (1− p)
∫ ∞
0
(∫ v′′
0
λ1(v
′) dv′
)
dF (v′′)
]
.
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